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ON THE VALIDITY OF PASCAL’S WAGER

I. INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes said that Pascal’s wager is valid. The battle is over the truth of its
premises, not whether its conclusion follows from them.1 I wish to raise and then to
respond to one possible reason for thinking that this claim is false – that Pascal’s
argument is not valid after all.
We can begin with the conclusion of the wager. It states, quite plainly, that we
should ‘wager for God’. At least in part, this means that we should form the belief that
God exists. Yet not directly, as we are frequently told. Pascal’s reasoning shows at best
that belief in God is pragmatically desirable. And Pascal concedes that we cannot always
form a belief simply because we desire to do so.2 Thus, to say that we should wager for
God is taken to mean that we should act like believers in the hope that genuine belief will
indirectly result.
But there is more to the story here. Wagering for God is not a task you can
perform once and for all, after which you can do whatever you please. Nor is it a project
you can undertake on and off, now and then, perhaps on high holidays. No, as Alan Hájek
notes, ‘“wagering for God” is an ongoing action—indeed, one that continues until your
death—that involves your adopting a certain set of practices and living the kind of life
that fosters belief in God’.3 Jeff Jordan concurs. He asserts that to wager for God is ‘to
commit to God’ in a wholehearted way such that one ‘reorient[s] one’s goals, and values,
and behavior by including the proposition that God exists among one’s most basic values
and beliefs’.4 To summarize, wagering is not a tentative affair. It requires approximating
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if not instantiating the unwavering devotion to God we find in the most recognized
paradigms of faith, the saints and the martyrs.5
The question I will investigate is whether the resources marshaled by the
Pascalian can provide a sufficient rational basis for this kind of behavior. Prima facie,
they cannot. Recent scholarship has shown that even the most compelling versions of the
wager have unstable premises. Their truth depends on what probability we assign to the
existence of various gods, what theology we find most compelling, and even what
religion we think will provide us with the greatest happiness in this life. Rational
judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Consequently, it is
possible for someone to find the wager persuasive initially, only to reconsider shortly
thereafter, all the while living up to the demands of reason. A foundation this precarious
is incapable of supporting a commitment as steadfast as the one described above. For if
the argument can fall through at any moment, and the commitment is rationally based
upon the argument, then the commitment can fall through at any moment.6 Or so it would
seem.
This objection is not new.7 But it has not been taken seriously enough. More
importantly, it has not been adequately answered. Such are the tasks I aim to accomplish
in this paper.

II. THE INSTABILITY OF THE WAGER
The following constitutes a more or less standard formulation of the argument:
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1. Rationality requires you to assign a positive probability to God’s existence.
2. The decision matrix is as follows:
God exists

God does not exist

Wager for God

∞

f1

Wager against God

f2

f3

Here f1, f2, and f3 are finite utility values that need not be specified any
further.
3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility
(when there is one).
4. Therefore, rationality requires you to wager for God.8
Objections to the premises of this version of the wager are legion. So too are
corresponding rebuttals. But whether the objections win out or the rebuttals defuse them
is not at issue here. Instead, I wish to point out that, even if the rebuttals succeed, even if
they disarm the standard barrage of objections, many of them have a troublesome side
effect. They introduce considerations that depend on the circumstances of the wagerer.
These circumstances can change over time, even as the result of mundane events in
everyday life. Thus, the rebuttals involve reformulating the wager in such a way that the
grounds it provides for entering into the religious life become unstable. The following
three examples illustrate the point.
(1) Consider the many-gods objection. It proceeds by pointing out that Pascal
oversimplified matters when he said: ‘Either God is or he is not’.9 There are many gods
that enjoy at least some possibility of existence. More than one of them promises an
infinite reward in return for our devotion. As a result, more than one religious option has

4
an infinite expected utility. (Since expected utility is calculated by multiplying the payoff
by the probability of the payoff, even a slight chance at an infinite payoff results in an
infinite expected utility.)
Other complexities arise here as well. There might be a god who rewards the
atheist or the agnostic. In fact, any imaginable religious or non-religious activity might
have a patron deity.10 Thus, every option carries with it an infinite expected utility.
However, on standard decision-theory frameworks, we are supposed to be indifferent
between options that carry identical expected utilities.11 We consequently find ourselves
in the situation of Buridan’s ass, unable to decide on rational grounds which way to go.
One way to address this problem is to appeal to what Jordan calls ‘the Next Best
Thing rule’.12 The rule states that if the best outcomes of the available options are the
same and the worst outcomes of the available options are also the same, we should
choose the option that fares best when neither the best nor the worst outcomes obtain. In
the case at hand, this means that we should investigate how things go if no gods exist and
thus no infinite payoffs are to be had or lost. In other words, we should think about the
wager from the point of view of the here and now, restricting our attention to ‘finite
terrestrial payoffs’.13
Yet how any given option fares from a this-worldly perspective, and thus which
option fares best, is situation-specific. For example, Judaism probably fares better in the
United States today than it did in Babylon during the time of the captivity. Atheism
probably fares better in more cosmopolitan regions of the world than in those where its
adherence results in social ostracism or worse. Similar differences likely exist on the
micro level. A particular profession, social circle, or family may be more or less
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hospitable to a particular lifestyle. Finally, individuals may find themselves to be
exceptions to any general trends. The upshot is that ‘the Next Best Thing rule’ may
recommend different options for different people. More importantly for our purposes, it
may recommend different options for the same person at different points in time—and it
may do so simply because the person has moved or found a different job.
(2) Suppose for the sake of argument that we have settled on one particular
religious option, say wagering for the Christian God. There is reason to think that we still
face something of a Buridan’s Ass situation. As Antony Duff and Alan Hájek point out,
every course of action has some probability, however small, of resulting in the relevant
kind of belief.14 Even if I choose something completely unrelated to wagering for the
Christian God, even if I head in the opposite direction, doing so still might lead me there
in the long run. But since wagering for the Christian God has the promise of an infinite
payoff, the fact that every course of action might lead there means that every course of
action has an infinite expected utility. Thus, once again, the wager does not allow us to
discriminate between the alternatives we face.
George Schlesinger’s response to this objection is to make use of a non-standard
decision-theoretic principle.15 He begins by acknowledging that, when dealing with finite
values, we must be indifferent between alternatives that carry the same expected utility.
However, this standard rule does not apply when dealing with infinite values. Here we are
permitted to rank options that have identical expected utilities. In fact, we should choose
the option most likely to secure the reward.16
This response makes a good bit of sense. In addition, it takes many options off the
table. Doing something completely unrelated to wagering for the Christian God is not
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very likely to result in belief. Thus, it is not very likely to secure the reward for doing so.
A more direct approach will have a greater chance of success.
Nevertheless, there is a problem here, namely there are many ways to proceed
directly. Indeed, there are as many ways as there are different theologies describing the
mechanism of salvation. For each such theology will offer its own account of what we
need to do to be saved.
Schlesinger’s principle in effect recommends that we embrace the theology we
consider most likely to be true. Yet, this judgment too is not a stable matter. A rational
judgment will depend on the available evidence. The available evidence can vary from
one person to the next. More significantly, it can vary over the course of any one person’s
life. At one point in time, it might support a Roman Catholic theology. At another, that of
the Southern Baptist Church. Something rather banal, such as perusing a new book at the
library, could effect such a shift. It follows that rather mundane events can result in the
wager recommending a different course of action for someone than it currently does.
(3) Another objection to the wager concerns its appeal to infinite payoffs. Many
have thought that such payoffs are inconsistent with standard formulations of decision
theory.17 Others have speculated that finite human beings cannot enjoy them.18 Finally,
infinite payoffs seem to be the real culprit behind the objections described above. It is
only because the potential payoffs are infinite that worshipping any one god, no matter
how bizarre, has the same expected utility as worshipping any other.19 And it is only
because the potential payoffs are infinite that turning away from God has the same
expected utility as devoting oneself to him. Thus, it is sometimes urged that advocates of
the wager should refrain from using infinite payoffs. They should assign a finite value to
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the reward enjoyed by true believers – yet one so great that it still swamps all competing
values.20
However, when the payoffs are finite, probabilities matter.21 First, the probability
of God’s existence must not to be too low. If it is, the magnitude of the reward received
in the afterlife will be negated. Consequently, atheism might win out. Second, the
probability of the Christian God’s existence must be greater than that of the Muslim
God’s. Moreover, it must be greater than that of any other god’s. If it is not, and if we
make the plausible assumption that all gods offer equal compensation for our devotion,
then wagering for the Christian God will not have the greatest expected utility. Following
some other god will be equally if not more prudent.
These considerations restrict the reach of the wager. To wit, it will work only for
those who make the aforementioned probability assignments.22 But whether any given
person does so depends on his or her individual circumstances. This is true even if people
are ideally rational. Rational probability assessments are supposed to be based, at least in
part, upon the available evidence. And, as noted above, different people may have access
to different evidence. More importantly, any one person may have access to different
evidence at different points in time. The evidence available to me right now might
indicate that a 50/50 probability assignment for God’s existence is warranted. Next week
I might attend a conference that provides me with new data – data that suggests such a
probability assessment is far too optimistic. If so, I will move from being within the
wager’s reach to being beyond it. Similarly, the evidence to which I currently have access
might speak in favor of the Christian God. Yet, upon further investigation, I might
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discover that there is greater support for the existence of Allah or Vishnu. If I do, the
wager will tell me to embrace a different religion.

III. THE APPARENT PROBLEM WITH AN UNSTABLE WAGER
To recap, on the most plausible ways to reconstruct Pascal’s wager, the argument is
unstable. Rescuing it from some common lines of objection requires introducing
considerations that depend on the circumstances of the wagerer. These circumstances can
change over time. More to the point, they can change in such a way that the argument no
longer goes through. Thus, even if the argument works now, it might not at some point in
the future. And the transition from success to failure can occur because of a trivial event,
such as moving to a neighborhood less tolerant of theism or perusing a book on Christian
theology at the local library.
By contrast, the religious way of life that Pascal’s wager recommends is supposed
to be stable. It is not supposed to waver in response to the mundane vicissitudes of
everyday life such as moving, changing jobs, attending conferences, and the like. We
cannot take this point lightly. Steadfastness is often viewed as a constitutive feature of the
religious life. Many scholars and devotees consider a faith open to revision to be
unworthy of the name.23 Even putting aside this point about religious grammar, religions
typically call for resoluteness.24 And Pascal’s wager traditionally has been construed as
an attempt to provide grounds for answering this call.25
In sum, the precarious nature of the wager does not match the steadfast nature of
the course of action it recommends. Robert Adams has argued that this kind of
incongruity is problematic.26 We can adapt what he says to our present purposes:
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Consider the person who becomes religious on the basis of a contemporary
version of Pascal’s wager. How is such a person going to react in the event that the wager
falls through? What will he or she do if circumstances in his or her life change and as a
result the decision calculus now supports a non-religious lifestyle?
There are two options. The person can either abandon the religious way of life or
stick with it. Both are problematic. On the one hand, abandoning God reveals that the
person was not committed to God in the relevant way. He or she did not possess the
unwavering devotion to God exemplified by the saints and the martyrs. On the other
hand, continuing to pursue God reveals that the person does not base his or her religious
commitment entirely on the wager. For his or her faith would persist even if the wager
collapsed. Therefore, by constructive dilemma, the wager cannot provide a sufficient
reason for becoming religious in a wholehearted fashion. Since the conclusion of the
wager states that we should become religious in that fashion, it follows that the wager is
invalid. Or so it seems.27

IV. AN UNSTABLE BASIS FOR A STABLE COMMITMENT
I think we can save Pascal’s wager from this objection. I believe a sophisticated kind of
stable commitment can have an unstable foundation. The example of marriage illustrates
how the setup might work.
People get married for a variety of reasons. One does it for love, another for
money, a third to raise a family, meet social expectations, or secure some disjunction of
the above. These are precarious grounds. People fall out of love or grow apart; sources of
money dry up; infertility afflicts many; and social expectations change. Despite all of
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this, marriage is supposed to be an unconditional affair. The traditional vows state that
both parties are to remain faithful in good times and in bad, in joy and in sorrow, in
sickness and in health, for richer or for poorer…until the point of death. Thus, we once
again face an unwavering commitment built upon a precarious foundation. Yet the
commitment here can be fully rational. Let me explain why.
We can think of getting married as tantamount to crossing a point of no return.28
What is interesting about points of no return is that there is a difference between the
rationale for crossing them and the rationale for continuing on after having crossed. The
former can be and often is unstable. It frequently involves the pursuit of ends that may
disappoint or never materialize. The latter, however, always includes the incontrovertible
fact that one cannot go back. This fact invariably provides a sufficient justification for
continuing on.
Thus, there are two deliberative stages. At the first stage, one decides whether to
cross the point of no return. The lure of some good lying on the far side may prompt an
affirmative response. Of course, there is often no guarantee that the good in fact resides
there. Crossing the point of no return in these cases constitutes a gamble. One may not
obtain what one seeks. Still, given the appropriate expected utilities, taking the gamble
may be reasonable. At the second stage, one decides whether to remain on the far side
after having crossed the point of no return. There is little need for actual deliberation
here. Only a single option exists. One must remain; one cannot go back. Therefore, by
taking a reasonable gamble, one can put oneself in the position of having to commit
unconditionally to a particular option.
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We can put the point in terms of marriage by saying that, once the vows have
been taken, they retain their moral force no matter what. Most conspicuously, they
remain morally binding even in the event that our reasons for taking them in the first
place collapse – even if we have fallen out of love, lost our money, cannot have children,
and see no prospect of future happiness together. After all, taking the traditional vows
involves asserting that one will remain faithful even in these sorts of situations.
Therefore, regardless of why we got married or what has happened since then, we always
have a sufficient reason to stay married, namely we have promised to do so.
The example of marriage and the more general phenomenon of crossing points of
no return show us that having an unstable basis for a stable commitment is logically
coherent. Therefore, if we think of wagering for God as akin to taking the marital vows or
to crossing a point of no return, we can escape the objection outlined in the previous
section.
There is nothing idiosyncratic about this move. At least within Christianity, we
find rites of conversion that include something analogous to the public promise that takes
place in a marriage ceremony. Consider, for example, the sacrament of confirmation
within the Catholic tradition and profession of faith within Protestant traditions.
Wagering for God on my account would inter alia involve engaging seriously in such a
practice.

V. THE THREAT OF A BAD MARRIAGE
There is a potential problem. Wagering for God in the manner just described carries with
it the risk of a ‘bad marriage’. One might end up having to live with a religion that one no
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longer recognizes as rationally desirable – i.e. a religion that one would not select if one
could choose all over again knowing what one now knows. This situation would result in
much unhappiness. Indeed, if the saying about bad marriages is trustworthy, nothing is
worse.
The prospect of a ‘bad marriage’ seems not to arise if one wagers against God
instead of for him. Why not? Simply put, there is no clear reason why the atheist must
wager in a non-tentative fashion. Atheism does not obviously demand the kind of
unwavering commitment that theism does. Thus, if theism suddenly becomes rationally
desirable, the atheist can always pack his or her bags. Conversion is always a legitimate
option.
This fact shifts the balance of expected utility by some finite degree in the
direction of wagering for atheism. Of course, a finite change will not affect the standard
version of the wager described at the outset of the paper. The infinite utilities at stake
there will swamp such considerations. However, versions of the wager that deal strictly
with finite utilities or that traffic in terrestrial payoffs will suffer. How much so depends
on the likelihood that a ‘bad marriage’ will arise. If the probability is quite high, the
increase in support of atheism will be substantial. If the probability is quite low, the effect
will be negligible.
There is reason to think that the probability should be on the low side. Returning
to our discussion of marriage will help us to see why. In the ideal case, the committed
spouse does not second-guess his or her commitment. He or she does not wander around
wondering whether someone else might have made a better match or pondering whether
bachelor(ette)hood might have been the way to go. Pursuing these lines of thought will
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tend to undermine the marital relationship. It will tend to disclose considerations that
must be overlooked if the relationship is to flourish. As such, it is the sort of thing that the
ideal spouse has committed not to do. For implicit in the marital vows is the promise to
avoid that which will erode the marital relationship and pursue that which will bolster
it.29 All of this suggests that the ideal spouse is not very likely to become aware of
reasons for thinking his or her marriage is a bad one. He or she is simply not looking for
them and, in fact, is looking in a different direction.
Something similar holds in the case of the ideal wagerer. Prior to making the
wager, he or she may devote much reflection to the merits of doing so. But once the
wager is made, a shift in attitude takes place. He or she no longer focuses on whether
wagering is warranted but on why it is so. That is to say, he or she looks for
considerations that further support his or her commitment to God, not ones that might
undermine it. Indeed, doing so is part of remaining faithful to that commitment. As a
result, the ideal wagerer is not very likely to arrive at the conclusion that he or she is ill
wed to the religious life. For he or she continually works in the opposite direction.
If this is correct, we need not worry very much about the threat of a ‘bad
marriage’. The degree to which its mere possibility shifts the expected utility in favor of
atheism is minimal. Thus, interpreting the conclusion of Pascal’s wager as analogous to
marital commitment or crossing a point of no return enables us to explain how the wager
can be valid despite the incongruity between its unstable premises and the stable course
of action it recommends.
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